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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN
FATAL RUSSIAN ROULETTE
To uphold a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, it is necessary
that the defendant's act caused the death.1 In establishing the necessary
causal connection, a problem exists as to the degree of participation
that is necessary to warrant a conviction. This problem is further
complicated where the deceased's own actions are a contributing
cause of death.
The recent case of Commonwealth v. A tencio2 involved a game of
"Russian roulette." The defendants, James Atencio and James Mar-
shall, spent the day with Stewart Britch in his room drinking wine.
During the course of the day Marshall brought a revolver into the
room and some hours later a game of "Russian roulette" was suggested.
In turn, each spun the chamber of the gun, which contained a single
bullet, pointed it at his head and pulled the trigger. There were no
adverse results until the pistol was passed to Britch who repeated
the process. When he pulled the trigger the gun went off and he fell
over dead. Both defendants were charged with and convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the con-
viction recognizing that the conduct involved was wanton and reckless
so as to be sufficient to sustain a conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter. The essence of such conduct was said to be "intentional
conduct, by way either of commission or omission where there is a
duty to act, and which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood
that substantial harm will result to another."3 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that there were three games of solitaire rather
than one game of "Russian roulette," and declined to consider the
deceased's taking of the gun as an independent intervening act. The
court also distinguished the defendant's analogy of the situation to
auto racing cases in which a defendant is usually held not guilty of
manslaughter where his competitor is killed as a result of the race.
4
The court reasoned that drag racing involves a large amount of skill on
the part of the participants, whereas "Russian roulette" is based sole-
ly on chance.
'26 Am. Jur. Homicide § 45 (1940).
'189 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1963).
'189 N.E.2d at 224; Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902
(1944); Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489, 55 N.E.2d 913 (1944).
'Thacker v. State, io3 Ga. App. 36, 117 S.E.2d 913 (1961); Commonwealth v.
Root, ,o3 Pa. 571, 17o A.2d 31o (1961).
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Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another
occasioned by the doing of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony,
or by a lawful act done in a negligent manner, or by negligently omit-
ting to perform a legal duty.5 It is homicide's "catch-all concept."0
But, in spite of the broad definition, there are limitations based on
causation, since a person is not criminally responsible for a homicide
unless his act can be said to be the cause of death.
7
It is submitted that in the principal case, the court has failed to
consider sufficiently the important factor of causation. The mere fact
the defendants were acting in a wanton and reckless manner does not
by itself establish the needed causation on which to base criminal lia-
bility. If the court had given sufficient consideration to this problem,
it might very well have found the defendants not guilty.
Professor Beale has discussed the problem of causation as applied
to criminal law.8 He points to two situations in which the defendant's
act may be connected by causation with the harmful result.9 First, the
defendant may actively have created a force from which the direct
result follows.10 This is the closest possible causal connection, as the
active force caused the direct result. Secondly, the defendant may have
created a condition upon which the final force directly acted.'" The
"defendant's force is really continuing in active operation, by means of
the force it stimulated into activity."'
2
To distinguish these situations: in the first, the force created re-
mains active to cause the result directly; in the second, the force cre-
126 Am. Jur. Homicide § I8 (1940); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 55 (1944). Though most
states have their own statutory definitions of involuntary manslaughter, the basic
common law definition is still generally applicable.
'Perkins, Criminal Law 56 (1957).
1"For conviction of manslaughter... the state must do more than establish
mere coincidence between such an act and the fact of death. It must establish the
,causal connection' between the violation and the loss of life." Perkins, Criminal
Law 59 (1957). Here, Professor Perkins is speaking of a situation where the homicide
resulted from the defendant's commission of a misdemeanor, but the statement is
also applicable where the conduct is wanton or reckless. See also, 26 Am. Jur.
Homicide § 45 (ig4o).
8Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1920).
"Id. at 648-58.
'Old. at 643-44. For example, a defendant would be criminally liable where
he assaulted a victim and as a result of the fright the victim died of a heart attack.
3id. at 646-47. For instance, a man's conduct would be the proximate cause of
the resulting harm where he, by threats of violence, causes his wife to run through
the house and jump out of a window; or where A, the defendant, employs B to kill
C. The wife's panic, causing her to run through the house, and B's act of killing
are the actual active forces, intervening after the defendant's acts. But, defendant's
behavior is proximate as it caused the intervening force.
-Id. at 646.
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ated was responsible for a new active force which actually caused the
result. Relating the factual situation of the principal case to Beale's
two situations concerning causation, it would fall under the second
category; the defendants themselves did not directly cause Britch's
death, but at most their participation in the game of "roulette" es-
tablished a condition and force upon which the resulting death may
be based.
However, as there are numerous causes for every result, an effort
must be made to determine the dominant one, or the cause to which
liability may attach.'3 This requires examining the facts to determine
if there has been any intervening or superseding cause' 4 that would
relieve the defendant of liability. In the principal case, it is believed
that the decedent's act was a superseding cause of his death. The fol-
lowing described cases involved situations in which the decedent's
own behavior has been a contributing cause of his death. Some courts
have found the behavior goes so far as to be a superseding cause;
others have not.
In People v. Freudenberg,'0 the defendant and his wife had been
drinking and quarrelling most of the day. A reconciliation was
reached, and in jest the wife stated, "You make me so mad, I could
kill you." The defendant said, "I can fix that," and got -his pistol. Im-
mediately after he handed the gun to the wife, it discharged and killed
her. The court affirmed a conviction of involuntary manslaughter
based on the defendant's reckless conduct in allowing his wife, who was
intoxicated and knew nothing of guns, to handle the weapon. Further-
more, the appellate court sustained the finding of the jury that the
defendant's acts were the cause of death and that the wife's acts did
not constitute an intervening cause.' 6
13Perkins, Criminal Law 6o8-og (1957).
"*Professor Perkins speaks of a sole or dominant cause and says, "A 'sole cause'
which intervenes between defendant's act and the result in question is spoken of
as a 'superseding cause."' A superseding cause is an act of a third party or other
force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for resulting
harm, even though his antecedent act is a factor in bringing it about. Perkins,
Criminal Law 609 (1957). Perkins describes an intervening cause as "one which
comes between an antecedent and a consequence." Perkins, Criminal Law 618 (1957).
Further distinctions may be made between dependent and independent intervening
causes. However, the courts have been inclined to use these primary terms of inter-
vening and superseding cause interchangeably. Recognizing that there may be many
causes leading to one result, the courts look to see if there was a factor, which
came between the defendant's act and the resulting death, that was so important
that it would relieve the defendant of liability. If so, it is frequently referred to as
either an intervening or superseding cause.
Zi.l Cal. App. 2d 564, 263 P.2d 875 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
"Id., .63 P."d at 885-87.
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In a recent Massachusetts case, Persampieri v. Commonwealth,
7
defendant and deceased were husband and wife. He told her he wanted
a divorce, and after some conversation, she threatened suicide. He
mocked her and told her where his rifle was. She brought it into the
room; he loaded it and continued to taunt her. The gun, solely in the
wife's possession, was between her legs with the barrel pointed to-
ward her head. It discharged and killed her. The court held the hus-
band's conduct to be criminally wanton. His wife was mentally dis-
turbed, and instead of trying to bring her to her senses, he showed
a complete disregard for her welfare.
Another situation where the courts have declined to find tie de-
ceased's conduct to be a sufficient intervening cause involves the so
called "alternative-danger-in-an-emergency concept."'18 In Letner v.
Tennessee,19 three persons were crossing a river in a small boat. The
defendant, hidden on the river bank, fired a gun into the water near
the boat in order to frighten the rowers. One of the occupants in at-
tempting to escape, jumped from the boat causing it to capsize. He
and another passenger were drowned, and the defendant was con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter. He appealed claiming that the
capsizing of the boat, caused by the decedent himself, amounted to
a supervening cause. The court rejected this argument since a super-
vening cause cannot be one which resulted from the defendant's act.
"'[I]f defendant's negligence was a cause of death, it is immaterial
that the negligence of the deceased himself.., also contributed there-
to .... Defendant's act or omission need not be the immediate cause
of death; he is responsible if the direct cause results naturally from
his conduct.' "20
The foregoing cases, regardless of other points of law involved, are
important in pointing to the fact that one may be charged with homi-
cide even where the deceased has directly caused his own death. Lia-
bility may be established by the causal connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the resulting death.
'1343 Mass. ig, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961).
ISMorris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 5o, 63 (1957). In an old English case, Lord Coleridge stated, "If a man
creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such
person to try to escape, and in doing so he injures himself, the person who creates
such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result." Regina v. Halli-
day, 61 L.T.R. (N. s.) 701, 702 (Crown Cas. Res. 1889); quoted in 1o5 U. Pa. L. Rev.
5o n.64.
"156 Tenn. 68, 299 S.W. 1049 (1927).




The oft-cited Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Campbell,21
on the other hand, shows when the necessary element of causation may
be lacking. The defendant was a participant in a riot which began as
a demonstration against a compulsory draft law. Several soldiers were
killed in trying to quell the uprising, but there was no evidence that
the defendant, Campbell, was actually responsible. The prosecutor
requested an instruction that if the defendant were merely engaged
in the unlawful riotous transaction, he was guilty of at least man-
slaughter for a resulting homicide. 22 The instruction was properly
refused and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
"No person can be held guilty of a homicide unless the act is
either actually or constructively his, and it cannot be his act
in either sense unless committed by his own hand or by some-
one acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common
object or purpose. '23
A further illustration of the proper strict application of the doc-
trine of causation is presented in the recent Pennsylvania case of Com-
monwealth v. Root.24 Here, two persons were racing in automobiles
and one was killed as a result of a collision with a third person. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the other's conviction of
manslaughter, holding that the defendant's participation was not a
sufficiently direct cause of death.25 The court did not discuss the
problem in the Root case in terms of a superseding cause. However,
stating that the defendant's conduct was not a sufficiently direct cause
of death is merely another way of saying that the deceased's own ac-
tions amounted to a superseding cause. The Pennsylvania statement
is phrased with reference to the defendant, whereas the language of
superseding cause is phrased with reference to the decedent's own acts.
It appeared for a time that Pennsylvania would be extremely lib-
eral in applying principles of causation in order to impose criminal
liability. In Commonwealth v. Almeida,26 the defendant and a co-
felon committed an armed robbery. They shot at policemen who re-
turned their fire. One policeman was shot and killed. The court stated
there was sufficient causation to convict the defendant of murder
based on the felony-murder rule, whether or not the fatal bullet was
-89 Mass. (7 Allen) 451 (1863).
2id. at 543. The court states that there is no authority for the position taken
by the Commonwealth.
'Id. at 544.
a4o3 Pa. 571, 17o A.2d 310 (1961).
-Id., 17o A.2d at 311.
'1362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
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fired by him or by a policeman. In Commonwealth v. Thomas,27 two
hold-up men tried to rob a store. The proprietor shot and killed one
of the felons and the co-felon was held guilty of murder.
This line of authority came to an end in the Pennsylvania case of
Commonwealth v. Redline.28 Here, the defendant and another were
engaged in a robbery and the co-felon was killed by a policeman. The
defendant was found not guilty of murder. The court expressly over-
ruled the Thomas case and cast doubt on Almeida. The authority of
the view expressed in the Redline decision has been further strength-
ened by the Root case as the court states that, although the former is
a murder case, "[t]he distinction between murder and involuntary
manslaughter does not rest upon a differentiation in causation... the
accused is not guilty unless his conduct was a cause of death sufficient-
ly direct as to meet the requirements of the criminal, and not the tort,
law."
20
In considering Beale's theory of causation and these cases, it
is possible to see how an argument of sufficient causation might be
made in the principal case. Atencio and Marshall actively participated
in the game of "roulette." The final force was the deceased's partici-
pation in the game, but the defendants helped create the condition
which brought this force into existence. It could be said that this was
in furtherance of a common design and that the result was the proba-
ble consequence of defendants' participation.
However, it seems that in the principal case, it would be prefer-
able to treat the decedent's act as a supervening cause which broke
the chain of causation. Although the defendants participated in "Rus-
sian roulette" and possibly even instituted the game, the deceased by
his own volition took part.30 It is true that one may be held criminally
2'382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
28391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
2 8
Note 24 supra at 311.
-"The decedent's mere contributory negligence does not relieve the defendants
of criminal liability. Indiana v. Plaspohl, 239 Ind. 324, 157 N.E.2d 579 (1959); State
v. Custer, 129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071 (1929); Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63
N.E. 607 (1902); 26 Am. Jur. Homicide § Li3 (94o); Perkins, Criminal Law 612-13(1957).
But, it is recognized that the deceased's conduct may go so far as to constitute
a superseding cause and relieve the defendant of liability. Cain v. State, 55 Ga.
376, 190 S.E. 371 (1937); Carbo v. State, 4 Ga. App. 583, 62 S.E. 140 (1908); State
v. Eldridge, 197 N.C. 626, 15o S.E. 125 (1929); Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7,
285 S.V. 565 (1926).
Professor Perkins, in his text on criminal law, states, "Even though the de-
fendant was criminally negligent in his conduct it is possible for negligence of
the deceased or another to intervene between this conduct and the fatal result in
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liable when the defendant's participation involves compulsion 3' on
the decedent, even though death is due to the decedent's own immedi-
ate act. But, the defendants in no way forced the deceased to take his
turn. Common sense dictates that where one assumes to participate
in an activity so dangerous to his welfare as a game of "Russian roul-
ette," the participant acts on his own initiative and only he is re-
sponsible for the consequences. 32 By taking the pistol for such a
dangerous purpose, the deceased's act looms so large a factor contrib-
uting to his death that the defendants' participation is hardly sufficient
to form the basis for criminal liability.
In declining to compare this case to the Root decision and another
similar holding,33 the court said "there is a very real distinction be-
tween drag racing and 'Russian roulette.' In the former much is left
to the skill, or lack of it, of the competitor. In 'Russian roulette' it is
a matter of luck .... -34 Such reasoning is avoiding a very real dis-
tinction. When A and B engage in a drag race, and A kills a third
party who is not participating in the race, B may be guilty of involun-
tary manslaughter.35 He has helped create the condition contributing
to the death of one who is removed from the cause. But where A, an
active participant is killed, B cannot be held liable for his death.
Where the deceased's own wilful, deliberate conduct contributes sub-
such a manner as to constitute a superseding cause, completely eliminating the
defendant from the field of proximate causation. This is true only in situations
in which the second act of negligence looms so large in comparison with the first,
that the first is not to be regarded as a substantial factor in the final result." Perkins,
Criminal Law 614 (1957).
3a6 Am. Jur. Homicide § 53 (1940).
rIn the Freudenberg case, deceased was intoxicated and knew nothing of the
proper handling of weapons. In Persampieri, deceased was mentally disturbed. So,
in both instances, defendants conduct in encouraging rather than preventing the
acts of the deceased amounted to reckless disregard for their safety. In the principal
case, defendant was not in a superior position so as to be required to exercise an
unusual duty of care. In State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 Atl. 6o9, 615 (1936), the
court stated, "In the determination of proximate cause common sense is not to be
eliminated." Applying common sense, it is hard to see how one can be held re-
sponsible for another's act of pointing a gun to his head and pulling the trigger
when no extraordinary duty of care was owed the deceased by the defendant.
0rhacker v. State, 103 Ga. App. 36, 117 S.E.2d 913 (196,). Here, defendant and
deceased were racing in autos when the latter lost control of his vehicle and was
killed. The court said that the defendant could not be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter as there was no showing that his acts caused the deceased to lose control




Note 2 supra at 225.
3-Indiana v. Plaspohl, 239 Ind. 324, 157 N.E.2d 579 (959); Nelson v. Nason,
343 Mass. 220, 177 N.E.2d 887 (1961).; Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237
(1912).
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